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The Balakot air strikes and the air combat thereafter in which a MiG-
21 Bison of the Indian Air Force (IAF) had to engage a much more 
modern F-16 of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has once again brought 
IAF modernisation back into focus. IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal BS 
Dhanoa, has said that the IAF has hit an all-time low of 31 fighter 
squadrons vis-à-vis the government authorised 42.1 He highlighted 
the convergence of strategic interests between China and Pakistan and 
their rapidly modernising Air Forces. The IAF, on the other hand 
has been slowly losing the combat edge that it had enjoyed over 
Pakistan in 1971 in terms of both quality and numbers. Technology 
intensive air power requires faster replacement of assets due to quicker 
obsolescence. 
Geo-politically, India is the most threatened and war risk-prone 
region of the world. India has serious boundary disputes with its 
two militarily powerful nuclear armed neighbours. China’s desire 
to dominate Asia and, in turn, the world has implications for India. 
Pakistan continues to be the epicentre of world terror. Pakistan has a 
clearly enunciated a ‘first-use’ nuclear policy against India. China has also 
helped Pakistan build up military strength to be able to counter India, 
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including acquiring technologies for its nuclear weapons and missile 
programme. China has strategic interests in using Pakistani territory 
to reach West Asia and Africa for trade and geo-strategic positioning. 
It has invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that 
connects the Xinjiang region in west China to the China-built-and-
operated Gwadar port near the Gulf of Hormuz. Simultaneously, China 
is investing in the Indian Ocean littoral countries to gain a foothold and 
extend its influence. Pakistan has not only stepped up the insurgency 
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), it openly boasts of collusive support 
from China in case of a war with India. India has to, thus, prepare for a 
possible two-front war.2 
Too often, the region has been going through trigger incidents 
which could lead to a war, whether it was Doklam with China in 2017 
or the more recent Pulwama terror attack by terrorist groups based in 
Pakistan, and  to avenge which, India launched punitive air strikes. It is 
clear that the IAF must win the air war for the Army and Navy to win the 
surface war. Aerospace is, thus, the domain of the future and the one who 
controls it, will control the planet. Air power today is the dominant means 
of prosecuting war. It offers prompt multiple response options to the 
political leadership in times of national security crises. Rapidly evolving 
technologies are bringing transformational changes that are multiplying 
speed, range, accuracy, and lethality for achieving military effects. India 
has to ride this bandwagon to find a place for itself on the high table of 
the world order. The IAF had recently tested its operational plans in a 
two-front scenario, in the mother-of-all-exercises, ‘Gagan Shakti’.3 While 
the IAF has a plan ‘B’ to fight with what it has, if forced into conflict, 
the numbers are clearly not adequate to fully execute an air campaign 
in a two-front scenario. It is incumbent upon the nation to provide the 
IAF assets for the task it has been entrusted. It is imperative that the IAF 
quickly rebuilds its squadron strength.
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Military Capability
The military power of a nation is an important constituent of its 
national power. Great powers need to achieve the ability to create, 
deploy and physically use military force.4 India was once a Pakistan-
centric regional power and now aspires for global influence and status. 
There is a need to constantly examine the type of war-fighting 
capabilities for employment of military force against the adversary 
to overwhelm his ability. The Indian armed forces are an important 
element of national power. In consonance with our national aspirations 
they need to transform through transactional means and prepare for 
future challenges. 
Transformation includes a review of doctrines, strategy and tactics, 
organisational structures, human resource adaption and training, and 
maintenance and logistics concepts to meet the operational requirements. 
The resounding success of air power in many campaigns, from the 
Falklands to the Gulf War, showcased its ability to simultaneously 
interfere in, as well as influence, land/sea operations. This has presented 
ramifications for all the Indian armed Services, and, more so, the main 
repository of air power, the IAF.
Air Power Attributes
Air power, offers strategic flexibility in terms of ability to quickly 
reconfigure for different kinds of missions.5 The overarching air operations 
give capability to project power at far distances without risking own 
motherland. Air power offers the political leadership strategic choices and 
alternatives for sustainable and easily scalable levels. Air campaigns can be 
executed against different target systems simultaneously. Air power has 
the inherent capability to provide both kinetic and non-kinetic options 
with pin-point accuracy. Air power can directly influence the outcomes 
and actions of the surface forces. It has the ability to simultaneously 
produce physical as well as psychological shock.
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IAF’s Doctrinal Shift
The IAF evolved initially primarily to support the surface and maritime 
wars, but post 1965, the IAF had clear stand-alone roles covering 
the entire spectrum of air operations, beyond just protecting Indian 
territories and safeguarding sea lines of communication. Its doctrine and 
acquisitions indicate strategic reach and conventional deterrence as major 
goals.6 The IAF is still the world’s fourth-largest air branch, albeit it has a 
depleting fighter squadron strength which stands at an all-time low of 30 
vis-à-vis the authorised 42 squadrons. Despite reasonable war experience, 
since the Burma campaign and in the more recent 1965 and 1971 Indo-
Pak Wars, the IAF initially did not have a well enunciated doctrine and 
only recently put in place a balanced force structure. The political masters 
have often shown reluctance to use air power due to the perceived fear 
of escalation of the conflict. The 1962 Indo-China War and 1999 Kargil 
conflict with Pakistan were cases in point. The ground reality in 1962 was 
that the IAF had relatively potent air power, with Western aircraft, vis-à-
vis the old Russian aircraft with China. Air power actually helped turn the 
tide in the wars of 1965, 1971 and even Kargil. 
The doctrine has now changed to take on a more offensive role against 
both adversaries. Introduction of combat enablers like the Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS), flight refuellers, strategic transport 
aircraft has made a difference. In the recent so-called mother-of-all-exercises 
‘Gagan Shakti’, the IAF tested out a possible two-front war and included 
inter-theatre movements of assets among practically all other domains of 
modern air power. Regional power projection and ability to take on China 
comprise the clear new doctrinal focus areas. The IAF’s 2012 doctrine 
clearly brings out the intent to dominate the conflict and a greater role 
of air power in the full spectrum of national security and diplomacy. The 
IAF sees deterrence and control of the air as linked. Its control of the air 
may not be absolute, but it hopes to possess sufficient control in order 
to prosecute the campaign. A game-changer shift took place on February 
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26, 2019, when India decided to use offensive air power by carrying out 
deep strikes against targets in Pakistan, even beyond Pakistan occupied 
Kashmir (PoK). The Pakistani bogie of nuclear retaliation and over-hang 
even against a conventional strike was demolished. 
Pakistan-Centric to China-Focussed Infrastructure 
Till very recently, all major air bases and radars were positioned on the 
Pakistan border. The bulk of the IAF assets were looking west. The same 
was the case with the Indian Army and Navy. Airfields are high-value 
targets. Aircraft on the ground are highly vulnerable and require ballast 
protection. Most eastern air bases were bare runways, with no ballast 
protection shelters, and, at best, a few Operational Readiness Platforms 
(ORPs). They were mostly used for fighter training and air maintenance 
operations. Emerging economic strength, self-confidence and doctrinal 
maturity allowed the IAF to look beyond the borders and reach out into 
the seas beyond the Indian island territories. 
China’s focussed concentration on building air power also made India 
have a rethink on its air strategy. Even the political class and strategic think-
tank circles realised the importance of the air as a decisive instrument of 
power projection. The lessons from Kargil also helped the IAF understand 
the real dimensions of fighting an air war at the Himalayan heights. The 
IAF’s aerial reconnaissance assets helped it pin-point targets which the 
Army could not have detected. Despite the localised conflict, the IAF 
maintained combat air patrols across the entire border. Air operations 
were round the clock. Laser weapons employed by the IAF could take out 
small bunkers, and successful strikes on the Pakistani main administrative 
and logistics hub at Muntho Dhalo dealt a major blow, and changed the 
way the IAF will fight a possible war across the Himalayas. It was clear 
that the application of air power has to be precise and proportionate. 
It was the first conventional conflict anywhere in the world between 
two nuclear powers, yet they prevented a nuclear escalation. It also gives 
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a reason for India to call the Pakistani nuclear bluff in the case of a limited 
conflict. The IAF’s all new platform and weapon acquisitions require 
operating clearance of 6 km and higher. Successful employment of air 
power, clearly spelt out in the Kargil Review report, also helped, the IAF 
get a larger proportion of the capital acquisitions budget. The IAF has 
now deployed the frontline fighter aircraft, SU-30 MKI and the C-130 
special operations aircraft, in the eastern sector while one Rafale squadron 
is also slated to be deployed in the east. 
Strategic Effect and Conventional Deterrence
Air power is inherently strategic in nature. Paucity of defence funding has 
forced India to evolve the doctrine that air power must deliver strategic 
effects through basic conventional means. Only air power can achieve 
this. While control of the air remains a desirable state, the IAF has limits 
to which it can achieve against both the PAF and People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force (PLAAF). India has also to defend itself against a possible 
sizeable Chinese Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) attack. U.S. think-
tanks are closely evaluating the IAF doctrine because India is seen as a 
possible counter-balance against China. Sino-Indian military competition 
and distrust remain. China continues to create military posts around India. 
Chinese rapid reaction forces are also deployed close to the border. India 
cannot match China’s numerical strength, but the IAF would provide a 
sufficiently strong “deterrent force”. 
The IAF now has credible “strategic reach”, and, in turn, 
deterrence. The IAF is looking at reach from the Persian Gulf to the 
Strait of Malacca, using long range aircraft supported by the Flight 
Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and AWACS. It is not only the range and 
weaponry, but the effect achieved that makes a mission strategic. 
Targeting of the leadership using air power, as was the case of the US’ 
strike on Osama bin Laden, and later by the IAF during the Balakot 
strikes could actually deliver strategic effects. Strategic airlift is another 
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area of strategic reach and strategic effect. Inter-theatre movement of 
a large force to support a counter-offensive or reinforce defences can 
have strategic effect.
IAF: Struggling with Modernisation and Maintenance 
The IAF has been struggling to phase-out many legacy platforms such 
as the MiG-21 and MiG-27. The IAF’s modernisation programme to 
achieve 42 squadrons of modern 4th generation plus fighters continues 
to be elusive. At the current pace, that figure may not be achieved even in 
2035. Critical to achieve the target are the acceleration of development 
and stepping up production of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft 
(LCA) Tejas variants; the need to acquire critical technologies for the 
development of the indigenous 5th generation fighter, the Advanced 
Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA); and hastening the process for 
acquiring 110 new fighters. In the case of expected delays in the AMCA, 
to choose between the SU-57 and the F-35 and acquire 3-4 squadrons 
as a stop-gap arrangement. In the meanwhile, procure the last remaining 
MiG-29s, Jaguars and Mirage-2000 to build up spares inventories 
through the reduce-to-build approach. The IAF cannot keep adding the 
SU-30 MKI beyond a point, lest it once again becomes fully dependent 
on the Russian basket. The IAF also needs to accelerate procurement of 
additional AWACS and FRA. AWACS and FRA will enhance the radius 
of action and weapon load carriage of air defence and offensive missions. 
Like many other Air Forces, the IAF must try reduce the multiple 
source fleets. The Russian SU 30-MKI, MiG-21, MiG-27 and MiG-29; 
French Rafale and Mirage 2000; British Jaguar; and indigenous LCA 
make many sources for the fighters. The USA and Sweden are also in the 
new fighter aircraft race. So many types of fighters also cause a training, 
logistics and maintenance nightmare. Maintaining the varied inventories 
of aircraft and weapon systems is a challenge. The life-cycle cost, long-
term agreements for spares, digital orders for provisioning planning with 
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the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) database are important 
issues. The USA is also putting pressure on India over its procurements 
from Russia. Despite being a balanced force, IAF modernisation continues 
to dither due to long delayed acquisitions and also low capital budgets. 
After the Kargil War, one area that required attention was the Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) system. Air power is normally 
a great source of intelligence for target selection and target prioritisation. 
High-definition imagery from satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles is a 
must. Better human intelligence in respect of Pakistan is important. 
Capability-Based IAF 
IAF transformation is being driven from being platform-based to 
becoming capability-based. Effects-based, network-centric operations are 
the new normal. The advantage of air power is its ability to exploit swing-
role capabilities. Modern platforms are critical. As Air Chief NAK Browne 
said, “Our aim is to preserve and maintain, upgrade and improve, and 
replace and acquire. At the end of this process, the IAF force structure 
will be modern and potent, with new and upgraded fleets only”.7 This 
action plan is underway, albeit a little slowly because of the fund crunch. 
Induction of high technology assets is on and existing fleets are going 
through mid-life upgrades. Any modern Air Force must have at least 40 
per cent of the combat fleet comprising high-tech all-weather multi-role 
platforms and the remaining 20 per cent under changeover but still giving 
strength through numbers. The heavy lift capability for both transport 
and helicopter fleets is crucial for inter/intra-theatre movements in war 
and sustaining troops and relief operations during peace-time. 
IAF—a Key Element: Need for Genuine Jointmanship 
Due to the multi-dimensional nature of conflict, increasing the levels of 
synergy amongst the armed forces and civil agencies is operationally critical.8 
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The IAF is going to be a key element in support of the surface, maritime 
and sub-surface wars. It has air assets to support such efforts. Lessons from 
peace-time joint exercises and also from past wars reveal that much more 
needs to be done on the jointmanship front. The Services continue to 
train and fight in compartments. Some level of Service upmanship exists. 
Elements such as Tactical Air Centres (TAC) and Maritime Element of Air 
Force (MEAF) are in place, however, often the Air Force is brought into 
the discussions when all the planning is already over. There is a need for 
the Services to have genuine respect for each other’s capability and use it to 
achieve national objectives. The three Services need to train for joint work 
more regularly. During the Kargil conflict, the attacks on the Pakistani air 
logistics hub at Muntho Dhalo finished the Pakistanis’ ability to sustain 
their campaign. The IAF and Indian Navy need more coordination for 
maritime strikes in view of larger and more aircraft carriers. The three new 
Tri-Service Commands for Special Ops, Cyber and Space would increase 
coordination and operational capability. 
India’s Proactive Policy Shift 
India has chosen the proactive approach towards national security. Its 
diplomatic engagement with the USA, the Arab world and East Asian 
nations is already paying dividends. India has been able to find a foothold 
in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and was invited as a guest 
of honour. India has successfully exposed Pakistan as the fountainhead 
of terror. The Uri strike was the first of its kind punitive military action 
in response to a terror incident. The Balakot air strike, nearly 60 km 
deep and well beyond PoK was the next level of the proactive policy 
shift. This indicates the self-confidence of the nation. The IAF has to be 
ready for combat and support the entire gamut of operations, from sub-
conventional, conventional to out of area to nuclear operations. For such 
a proactive stance to be maintained, the cutting edge of the Indian armed 
forces would have to be kept sharp, with modernisation keeping pace.
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Hybrid Threats: Air Power as Guarantor
Hybrid threats9 take advantage of modern technologies for espionage, 
sabotage, data collection, attacks on people or infrastructure, or the 
achievement of media effects. Hybrid warfare exploits the vulnerabilities 
of the system. The air domain is being increasingly exploited to perpetrate 
illicit and terrorist attacks. Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
technologies have greatly improved the non-state actors’ aerial warfare 
capabilities. For long, it was thought that air power could only support 
the land forces to counter hybrid threats. However, it is now clear that 
air power can act independently against hybrid threats. Air policing, air 
defence, and intervention against civilian aircraft or against a hybrid 
threat are evolving. 
The Area Defence Commander is authorised to act against all 
terrorist, illegal, hazardous and dangerous acts in the air domain. National 
resilience and the nation’s will to prevent and deny threats represent a 
strong deterrent in hybrid warfare. A new paradigm that transforms the 
traditional concept of Air Defence (AD) with the appropriate level of 
flexibility to manage the new aerial hybrid threats is required. Satellite and 
aerial surveillance, air traffic management, cyber space monitoring, low 
Radar Cross-Section (RCS) detection, multi-sensor fusion and tracking, 
and, finally, kinetic and less than kinetic engagement, using laser beams 
or directed energy weapons are some of the means. 
IAF Backs Indigenisation
The IAF’s transformation can never ignore the need to become 
independent from foreign defence supplies. For India to be a significant 
player, the local defence industry has to succeed. The vice-like hold 
of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), especially Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has not helped indigenisation to succeed. Since 
2001, India has been continuously refining its Defence Procurement 
Procedure (DPP) to support indigenisation and create a level playing 
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field for the private industry, but things have not changed much. The 
private industry still needs hand-holding. India continues to have the 
unfortunate distinction of being the world’s biggest arms importer. India 
has not been able to leverage this, or its economic muscle, to get critical 
technologies transferred despite the offsets clauses in most contracts. The 
joint venture approach and public private partnerships have worked. The 
BrahMos is a good example. This needs to be explored further. India 
must take the leap beyond just licensed production. The IAF has been 
openly supporting all indigenous programmes by accommodating delays 
and allowing concessions. But India must remember that any fighting 
force requires equipment that should be as good as the adversary’s or 
better. 
Human Resource Development 
The air action of February 27 in which Wing Commander Abhinandan 
Varthaman shot down a much superior F-16 indicates the level of operational 
flying training and aggressive intent required in an air warrior. Modern 
combat aircraft are at the front end of technology. Just mastering such 
technology is not sufficient, one should be able to use it optimally during 
split second combat conditions. The IAF crew must remain ahead of the 
technology employment curve. The IAF is already extensively using aircraft 
simulators. Joint training for integrated application in operations would also 
be a core area. 
Transformational Leadership
A critical attribute for a force to succeed is the development and preparation 
of leaders at various levels. For military aviation, it could be at the section 
level, a combat formation leader, a Flight or Squadron Commander, 
an air base Commander or a Commander-in-Chief. A leader must have 
charisma, should be able to set an example and become a role model, 
and intellectually stimulate subordinates. He should project a sense of 
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urgency,10 formulate a strong coalition, create and communicate the 
vision, and yet invite and support others’ ideas. In the air, each formation 
member has a complementary role, and depending on the air situation, 
the control could physically shift among members, even though the 
overall command remains with the leader. Leaders can win or lose wars. 
Leaders must move with the changing times and adapt to technological 
changes. The IAF needs to nurture young leaders. 
Budgetary Inadequacy: Unfortunate Reality
The 2019-20 defence budget at Rs 3,01,866 crore ($42.7 billion) is 1.44 
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The capital budget for 
the entire Ministry of Defence (MoD) is Rs 1,03,380 crore. The budget 
for capital acquisition is Rs 81,422 crore. As per an Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses (IDSA) report by Laxman K Behera,11 in 2018-
19, as against Rs 1,10,044 crore required for committed liabilities, the 
total allocation for modernisation—which includes past liabilities—was 
Rs 74,116, leaving a gap of Rs 35,928 crore or 33 per cent. Against this 
shortage, the increase of a mere Rs 7,198 crore would only compound the 
problem for the MoD which would be in an extremely difficult situation 
to prioritise its payments for both the previously signed contracts and the 
contracts to be signed till the end of 2019-20. 
The IAF’s total budget share is Rs 68,949 crore—23 per cent of the 
total. The IAF’s capital outlay is Rs 39,347 crore which is 57 per cent 
of its total allocation. In this count, the IAF has the highest percentage, 
more so when one compares with the manpower intensive Indian Army’s 
18 percent. Unfortunately, the bulk of the IAF’s capital allocation will be 
used for committed liabilities of earlier purchases such as the Apache and 
Chinook helicopters, Rafale, LCA and S-400. The IAF is a technology 
intensive Service. Airborne systems reach obsolescence earlier. Also 
airborne systems have flight safety issues and cannot be stretched beyond 
a point. The IAF will need out of budget funds for new acquisitions.
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The Way Ahead
The uncertainties that will accompany the drawdown of US forces 
from Afghanistan and its influence on the regional security dynamics is 
likely to have a negative impact on the regional security environment. 
India has to prepare for the geo-political shift to the Indo-Pacific region 
and the rise of China as a significant aerospace power. Future conflicts 
will be short, swift and intense engagements against a nuclear backdrop 
which may be followed by long stabilisation periods. A quantum jump in 
precision and lethality of weapon systems may result in non-linearity and 
increased tempo of operations. Often, as in the case of the Balakot strikes, 
operations could be in the ambiguous zone of ‘neither peace nor at war’. 
Wars will increasingly be multi-domain, varying from non-contact to 
contact warfare. The IAF will have to build deterrence and have the 
ability to dominate the air. It will have to induct modern systems for 
situational awareness, intelligence and precision strike ability. It will 
require fixed and rotary wing tactical and strategic air transport assets. 
The transformation would be spread over a period of time. The IAF 
is looking at a horizon of 15 years. Technological advancements and 
evolving changes would have to be factored in. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
has great applications for air power. India must take an early lead. Future 
security challenges will be more and more complex, multi-dimensional 
and non-traditional in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. The IAF would 
need to think differently to be able to tackle the various asymmetric and 
non-traditional security threats and would require more innovative, out-
of-box solutions the which would leverage the prevalent technology. 
Seamless integration of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence is 
critical for both capability building and focussed operations as, per the 
national political directives. It will help better visionary planning, and 
commitment of national resources. For India to be secure, the IAF must 
continue to touch the sky with glory.
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